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Abstract
We construct an equilibrium theory of learning from search in the labor market,
which addresses the search behavior of workers, the creation of jobs, and the wage
distribution as functions of unemployment duration. In the model, each worker has
incomplete information about his job-ﬁnding ability and learns about it from his
search outcomes. The theory formalizes a notion akin to that of discouragement:
over the unemployment spell, unemployed workers update their beliefs about their
job-ﬁnding abilities downward and reduce their desired wages. One contribution of
the paper is to integrate learning from search into an equilibrium framework. We
show that the equilibrium exhibits wage dispersion among homogeneous workers,
and that workers with longer unemployment spells have lower permanent incomes.
Another contribution is to apply lattice-theoretic techniques to analyze learning from
experience, which is useful because learning generates convex value functions and, in
principle, multiple solutions to a worker’s optimization problem.
JEL classiﬁcations: E24, D83, J64.
Keywords: Learning; Wages; Unemployment; Directed search; Supermodularity.
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The estimated costs of unemployment to workers in terms of future wage losses are substan-
tial, and longer unemployment spells are associated with signiﬁcantly larger losses (e.g.,
Nickell et al., 2002). In this paper, we construct a theory of learning from search and use it
to explain how this evidence can be consistent with a labor market equilibrium. The main
assumption is that each unemployed worker does not have precise knowledge of his job-
ﬁnding ability and, therefore, learns about this ability from search histories. We embed this
assumption into a model of directed search to characterize the search behavior of workers,
the creation of jobs, and the wage distribution. Employing lattice-theoretic techniques, we
show that in the labor market equilibrium, each unemployed worker reduces the wage he
searches for as his unemployment duration increases.
Learning from search captures a notion akin to discouragement. Search outcomes con-
tain useful information when workers have unknown search ability that determines how
likely they will be a good match to a random ﬁrm. After a worker fails to ﬁnd a match, he
updates his beliefs about his own ability downward and, hence, becomes more pessimistic
about his probability of ﬁnding a job. In subsequent searches, the worker will lower his
desired wage in order to increase the probability of getting a match. Despite the intuitive
appeal of this mechanism, it has not been incorporated into an equilibrium analysis; in-
stead, the learning literature has focused on a single agent’s optimal stopping problem. In
the absence of an equilibrium framework, it is diﬃcult to assess whether learning can occur
in the equilibrium or learning from search is a robust explanation for the dependence of
observed wage outcomes on workers’ unemployment spells. The objective of this paper is
to examine the interactions between search decisions, job creation and wage oﬀers in order
to understand the equilibrium consequences of learning from search.
The main diﬃculty in analyzing learning from search in an equilibrium framework stems
from the need to address the interaction between individuals’ learning and aggregate prices.
To appreciate why, it is useful to consider the work of Burdett and Vishwanath (1988),
where workers learn about the unknown distribution of wages. In their model, each worker
receives a wage oﬀer from an exogenous distribution and then decides whether to accept
the oﬀer or to reject it and continue to search. A worker who receives an oﬀer lower than
expected revises his beliefs about the wage distribution downward. Workers with longer
unemployment spells are precisely the workers who have drawn and rejected relatively lower
wages in the past, and so they perceive the jobs available to them as jobs oﬀering low wages.
As a result, reservation wages are negatively related to unemployment spells. While this
1is an interesting result, Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) examine only the workers’ side of
the labor market. In equilibrium, however, learning by the market participants will aﬀect
the wage distribution by aﬀecting ﬁrms’ decisions on wage oﬀers.
To provide a tractable analysis of an equilibrium with learning from search, we change
two modeling aspects. First, we propose that the source of incomplete information is a
worker characteristic. We model this characteristic as a worker’s exogenous ability that
aﬀects his eﬃciency units in search. The advantage of this modeling assumption is that this
fundamental characteristic does not change with learning. In contrast, when agents learn
about the wage distribution, the distribution itself changes as ﬁrms update their beliefs
and change their wage oﬀers. Second, we model search as a directed and competitive
process.1 Similar to Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), this search process allows individuals
to sort themselves into submarkets, which makes the equilibrium analysis tractable by
eliminating the dependence of individuals’ decisions on the wage distribution.2
In more detail, our model is as follows. Each worker has an unknown permanent ability,
which is either high or low. Ability determines the worker’s eﬃciency units in search but,
once matched, all workers have the same productivity. The process of competitive search
is as follows. There is a continuum of submarkets, each of which is associated with a wage
and tightness. Firms and workers observe all such pairs and choose which submarket to
enter, understanding that a submarket with a higher wage has relatively fewer vacancies.
We refer to this choice as the agent’s search decision and the wage in the chosen submarket
as the worker’s desired wage. In each submarket, the number of matches is given by a
function of the number of vacancies and the total eﬃciency units of searching workers in
that submarket. In any given submarket, a worker with higher ability has a higher matching
probability than a worker with lower ability. However, this matching probability remains
unknown because an individual does not know his ability. Information is incomplete but
symmetric. In particular, all search histories are public information.
Search outcomes convey useful information about a worker’s type. When an unem-
ployed worker searches and fails to ﬁnd employment, the worker views this search outcome
as bad news and revises his beliefs downward. Subsequently, he will choose to search for
1Peters (1984, 1991) formulates directed search as a strategic problem. Burdett et al. (2001) and Shi
(2001), among others, have further explored this strategic formulation. Competitive search is analyzed by
Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). In a large market, the two formulations often generate
the same equilibrium outcome.
2Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) analyze sorting according to workers’ wealth, unemployment beneﬁts
and/or risk aversion. However, their result that competitive directed search induces sorting is more general
than their model’s speciﬁcs. We explore sorting according to workers’ beliefs about their own matching
abilities. Shi (2001) analyzes sorting according to workers’ skills.
2jobs that will be easier to get. Those jobs will necessarily come with lower wages as part of
the equilibrium tradeoﬀ between wages and market tightness. Thus, learning from search
induces not only reservation wages, but also desired wages, to decline with unemployment
duration. As ﬁrms cater to the workers with diﬀerent beliefs, there is a non-degenerate
distribution of equilibrium wages among ex ante identical workers (between submarkets).3
In addition to an equilibrium formulation of learning from search, we provide an analyt-
ical procedure for resolving a main theoretical problem in the analysis of optimal learning
from experience. This problem is caused by convexity of the value function. Because
search outcomes generate variations in a worker’s posterior beliefs about his ability, search
conveys valuable information only if these variations in beliefs are valuable to the worker,
that is, if the worker’s nonlinear value function is convex in beliefs. Although the literature
(e.g., Easley and Kiefer, 1988) recognizes that such convexity is likely to lead to multiple
solutions and to render the ﬁrst-order conditions inapplicable, previous work has either ig-
nored the diﬃculty or focused on corner solutions (e.g. Balvers and Cosimano, 1993). We
resolve this diﬃculty by exploiting a connection between convexity of the value function
and the property of supermodularity in lattice-theoretic techniques.
This connection is not obvious at ﬁrst glance and, to our knowledge, has not been ex-
amined. In our model, neither a worker’s current payoﬀ nor his objective function is super-
modular as is often required in applications (see Topkis, 1998, and Milgrom and Shannon,
1994). We proceed in two steps. First, we use convexity of a worker’s value function to
show that a particular monotone transformation makes the worker’s objective function su-
permodular. This approach diﬀers considerably from other applications of lattice-theoretic
techniques to dynamic programming (e.g., Amir et al., 1991, Mirman et al., 2007), which
assume the value function to be concave. Second, we establish that workers’ optimal deci-
sions (i.e., desired wages) are strictly decreasing with unemployment duration. Generally,
lattice-theoretic techniques establish only weak monotonicity. For strict monotonicity, the
literature has required strong assumptions on diﬀerentiability, e.g., Amir (1996) and Edlin
and Shannon (1998). Because such assumptions can be violated here, we establish strict
monotonicity in an alternative way, again by exploiting convexity of the value function.
In our model, learning from search induces sorting of workers according to their beliefs
about matching ability. Because beliefs are deteriorating during unemployment, work-
ers choose to sort themselves out according to unemployment duration even though they
3Workers who diﬀer in ex post beliefs may also choose diﬀerent levels of search intensity and labor
market participation. Although our analysis can shed light on such diﬀerences, we choose to abstract from
them in the interest of simplicity.
3have the same productivity once employed. This sorting mechanism is diﬀerent from the
common argument that workers with lower productivity tend to have longer unemploy-
ment spells (Lockwood, 1991) or that workers’ skills deteriorate during unemployment
(Pissarides, 1992). Also, Blanchard and Diamond (1994) examine sorting among workers
of the same productivity by showing that unemployment duration can act as a device for
equilibrium selection. Speciﬁcally, they use a random-matching model to show that there is
an equilibrium in which ﬁrms give employment priority to workers with lower employment
durations even though there is no fundamental reason for such a bias. In their model, the
distribution of wages is degenerate, and the length of the unemployment spell has no eﬀect
on a worker’s future wage. In contrast to this mechanism, sorting in our model is a result
of learning driven by the workers’ willingness to accept lower wages as their beliefs about
their ability deteriorate during unemployment. Finally, learning from search generates the
dependence of a worker’s job-ﬁnding probability on unemployment duration, which we will
discuss in Section 6.
2. The Model
2.1. Agents, Markets and Matching
Time is discrete and all agents discount the future at a rate r>0. There are large numbers
of workers and ﬁr m s . Aw o r k e ri se i t h e re m p l o y e do ru n e m p l o y e d . W h e ne m p l o y e d ,a
worker produces y>0 units of goods. When unemployed, a worker searches for a job, and
the utility of leisure is normalized to zero. To focus on learning from search, we assume
that employment is an absorbing state.4 In this environment, the steady state distribution
of workers is non-trivial only if there is a ﬂow into unemployment. For this reason, we
assume that the labor force grows at a constant rate n>0. Thus, if L is the labor force
at the beginning of period t,am a s snL of new workers enters the labor market in period
t through unemployment. The number of ﬁrms is determined endogenously by free entry,
as described later.
Each worker has unknown ability, a, that is equal to either aH or aL,w h e r eaH >a L > 0.
A worker’s ability determines the worker’s eﬀectiveness in the matching process, as speciﬁed
later.5 This unknown ability is a permanent characteristic, determined at the time when
4If a worker’s ability, described below, is a new draw every time a worker enters unemployment, then
it is straightforward to incorporate workers’ re-entry into unemployment through job separation.
5We are very grateful to Daron Acemoglu and the referees for directing us toward this formulation. In
a previous version of the paper (Gonzalez and Shi, 2007), we formulated the problem as one of incomplete
information about the characteristics of local markets rather than individuals.
4the worker enters the labor market. A new worker has ability aH with probability p,a n daL
with probability (1 − p), where p ∈ (0,1). We call a worker with aH a high-ability worker,
and a worker with aL a low-ability worker. We will also use the notation ai ∈ {aH,a L}.
The timing of the events in a period is as follows. First, new workers enter the labor
market through unemployment and nature determines the ability of each new worker, while
the ability of a worker who was born in the past remains the same as before. Second, all
ﬁrms and unemployed workers make their search decisions. Third, after the matching
process is completed in the period, matched ﬁrms and workers exit the search process to
produce permanently, while unmatched workers remain unemployed.
Search is competitive, as follows. There is a continuum of submarkets indexed by
x, which will be related to matching rates in that submarket. The domain of x is X =
[0,1/aH]. A submarket x is characterized by a wage level, W(x), and a tightness, λ(x). The
functions W(.)a n dλ(.) are public information, taken as given by agents and determined
in the equilibrium. In each period, a worker’s or a ﬁrm’s search decision is to choose which
submarket to enter, i.e., x. Search is directed in the sense that an agent’s choice of a
submarket involves a tradeoﬀ between the wage and the tightness, because a submarket
with a high wage has relatively fewer vacancies per worker in the equilibrium. Note that in
line with the formulations by Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), a ﬁrm does
not directly set wages. Instead, by choosing a submarket, a ﬁrm chooses a pair (w,λ)f r o m
the menu {(w(x),λ(x)) : x ∈ X}.6
Since workers diﬀer in their search eﬀectiveness, we deﬁne the total eﬃciency units of
workers searching in submarket x as
ue (x)=aHuH (x)+aLuL (x), (2.1)
where ui (x), for i ∈ {L,H}, denotes the mass of unemployed workers with ability ai who
choose submarket x.L e t v(x) be the number of vacancies created in submarket x,a n d
deﬁne the eﬀective tightness in this submarket as λ(x)=v(x)/ue (x). We assume that
the number of matches in submarket x is given by a function, F (ue (x),v(x)). The index





6Although the submarkets can alternatively be indexed by workers’ unemployment duration, τ,i ti s
more convenient to index them by x. First, all the eﬀects of τ on agents’ decisions eventually go through x
because a worker’s tradeoﬀ is between the wage and the matching probability. Second, in contrast to the
discrete variable τ, x is a continuous variable which allows agents to make a continuous tradeoﬀ between
w and x.
5For a worker with ability ai, the matching probability in submarket x is aix.T h u s ,g i v e n
x, the lower a worker’s ability, the lower his matching probability.
We impose the following standard assumption on the matching function F:
Assumption 1. The function F(ue,v): (i) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice
diﬀerentiable in each argument, (ii) is linearly homogeneous, and (iii) has F(u,0) = 0 and
F(u,∞) > 1/aH for all u ∈ (0,∞).






00(x) > 0, for all x ∈ (0,1/aH]. (2.2)
Note that for a vacancy in submarket x, the matching probability is F/v = x/λ(x). The
above properties of λ imply that a ﬁrm’s recruiting probability decreases in x.T h a ti s ,i f
it is easy for a worker to ﬁnd a job at x,i tm u s tb ed i ﬃcult for a ﬁrm to recruit at x.
The following examples of the matching function satisfy Assumption 1 and will be
considered in various parts of our analysis:
Example 2.1. (i) One example of F is the CES function: F(ue,v)=[ ( 1− α)uρ
e + αvρ]
1/ρ,
where ρ<1 and α ∈ (0,1).I n t h i s c a s e , λ(x)=[ 1+( xρ − 1)/α]
1/ρ.A s p e c i a l c a s e o f
this example is the Cobb-Douglas function, where ρ =0 ,w h i c hl e a d st oλ(x)=x1/α.( i i )
Another example is the urn-ball matching function: F(ue,v)=v
¡
1 − e−ue/v¢
.I nt h i sc a s e ,




The key feature of the model is the incomplete information about worker ability in
the matching process. Because the matching probability is less than one regardless of the
worker’s ability, failure to match does not automatically imply that the worker has low
ability. Thus, a worker who fails to obtain a match faces a signal extraction problem.
Search histories are informative because low-ability workers are more likely to fail to get
matches in any given period. In contrast to workers, ﬁr m sd on o tf a c eas i g n a le x t r a c t i o n
problem. Given a ﬁrm’s choice of the submarket, the ﬁrm’s matching probability and
expected proﬁt are determined independently of any particular worker’s ability.
Note that our formulation implies that there is no need for individual agents to learn
about the composition of workers’ abilities in a submarket. To see this, consider an arbi-
trary submarket x where the total eﬃciency units of workers are ue (x). Free entry of ﬁrms
into the submarket will ensure that the eﬀective tightness will indeed be λ(x), and so a
worker’s or a ﬁrm’s matching probability and expected payoﬀs in the submarket will be
6determined independently of the level and the composition of ue (x). This feature clearly
depends on the use of directed search, but it also depends on the matching function. If
we speciﬁed the matching function instead as F (uH (x),u L(x),v(x)) where the ﬁrst two
variables are not perfect substitutes, then an agent’s matching probability and the wage
oﬀered in the submarket would depend on the composition, (uH (x),u L (x)). In this case,
a worker would use unemployment duration to make inference on this composition in addi-
tion to learning about his own ability. An equilibrium analysis would be complicated as the
composition evolves with unemployment duration. Although this role of unemployment
duration in the inference of the ability composition in each submarket is interesting, it is
not a necessary part of a worker’s learning about his own ability. By eliminating this role,
our formulation maintains tractability.
In the interest of clarity, let us emphasize the information structure. Information is
symmetric in the sense that all workers’ search histories and all statistics in each submarket
are common knowledge. In particular, every agent observes the number of vacancies,
the number of matches, and the composition of workers in each submarket. Despite the
availability of such public information, individual workers can still learn from their private
search histories.
2.2. Learning from Search
Workers update their beliefs about ability after observing whether or not they have a
match. The updating depends on the particular submarket into which the worker just
searched. To describe the updating process, it is convenient to express a worker’s belief in
terms of his expected type. Let the initial prior expectation of a for a worker who has not
yet searched be μ0 ∈ (aL,a H). From the distribution of new workers across ability types,
we can calculate: μ0 = paH +( 1− p)aL,w h e r ep ∈ (0,1 ) .T h i sm e a nb e l i e fi sc o m m o nt o
all new workers and it is public information.
Consider the updating process for an arbitrary worker. Let Pi be the prior probability
with which a = ai,w h e r eai ∈ {aH,a L}.L e t μ b et h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fa according to
this prior belief and refer to μ simply as the belief. Note that the prior distribution of a is








Let k ∈ {0,1} be the matching outcome in the current period, where k =0i ft h ew o r k e r
7f a i l st og e tam a t c ha n dk = 1 if the worker succeeds in getting a match. Then,
P(ai|x, k =1 )=
ai
μ




The conditional distribution of a is Bernoulli with mean E(a|x,k)=aHP(aH|x,k)+
aL [1 − P(aH|x,k)]. Substituting P (aH|x,k) from (2.4) and PH from (2.3), we have:
E(a|x,k =1 )=aH + aL − aHaL/μ;
E(a|x,k =0 )=aH −
1−xaL
1−xμ (aH − μ).
(2.5)
Note that if the initial mean belief μ0 exceeds aL, E(a|x,k) >a L for both k =0a n dk =1 .
The updating process above has two preliminary properties. First, the sequence of
mean beliefs is a Markov process. Second, a worker’s mean belief, μ,i sas u ﬃcient statistic
for the worker’s unemployment history. Denote the domain of μ as M =[ aL,a H].
The value of x measures the informativeness of search. Search in a market with rela-
tively higher x is more informative in the sense of Blackwell (1951). Consider the infor-
mation revealed by search in two diﬀerent submarkets, with x>x 0.L e t K and K0 be
the random number of matches associated with x and x0. Intuitively, one can construct
the random variable K0 by “adding noise” to K as follows. First, let the worker random-
ize with probability of success ax,w i t ha ∈ {aL,a H}; then, whenever the realization is
a success, randomize again with success probability x0/x. The result is a Bernoulli trial
with probability of success equal to ax0. In other words, if x>x 0, the random variable, or
experiment, K is suﬃcient for K0 (see DeGroot, 1970, pp.433-439).
The informational content of x is asymmetric with respect to the matching outcome.
After a successful match, a worker’s posterior, P(a|x,k = 1), and the posterior mean belief,
E(a|x,k = 1), are independent of x, because the probability of getting a match is linear in
x regardless of the worker’s type. However, after a match failure, a worker’s posterior and
the posterior mean belief both depend on x.
Because our focus is on unemployed workers’ decisions, it is useful to explicitly write
the posterior belief of a worker who fails to ﬁnd a job as E(a|x,k =0 )=H (x,μ), where
H(x,μ) ≡ aH −
1 − xaL
1 − xμ
(aH − μ). (2.6)
One can verify the following properties (the veriﬁcation is omitted here):
Lemma 2.2. The function H(x,μ) satisﬁes: (i) H1 < 0;( i i )H2 > 0, (iii) H11 =
2μ
1−xμH1 <
0 and H22 = 2x
1−xμH2 > 0;( i v )μ(1 − xμ)H12 − H1 − μ2H2 = −aHaL.
8Property (i) states that a higher x reduces the worker’s posterior beliefs after the
worker fails to ﬁnd a match, as discussed above. In particular, property (i) implies that
H(x,μ) <μfor all x>0a n dμ>a L. Thus, a worker’s beliefs about his ability decrease
over time as the number of search failures increases. Of course, if a worker’s beliefs have
reached aL, there is no further updating; that is, H(x,aL)=aL for all x. Property (ii)
states that, for any given x, a worker with higher prior beliefs will also have higher posterior
beliefs. Properties (iii) and (iv) will be useful later.
2.3. The Value of Search
Consider an unemployed worker who enters a period with belief μ.L e tV (μ) be his value
function. If he chooses to search in submarket x, the expected probability of ﬁnding a
match is xμ. In principle, some workers may have incentive to engage in the following “ex-
perimentation”: searching during a period solely to gather information and, thus, refusing
to enter a match once they learn that a match has occurred. This may occur because a
worker who found a match in submarket x will revise his belief upward (see (2.5)). We
do not think that this form of experimentation is important in practice, unless it is as-
sociated with heterogeneous matches, which is not the case here. Thus, we rule out such
experimentation by focusing on the case in which search is suﬃciently costly that a worker
always prefers to accept a match that he searches for.
Assumption 2. Labor productivity satisﬁes: y/c ≥ (1 + r)aHλ(1/aH).
This suﬃcient condition implies that a worker prefers getting the lowest equilibrium
wage every period starting now to remaining unemployed in the current period and then
getting the full surplus from a match every period starting with next period. Intuitively,
the condition requires that the opportunity cost of rejecting a match, as reﬂected by y,
should be suﬃciently high to a worker.7 Stronger than necessary, this condition signiﬁcantly
simpliﬁes the analysis and the exposition of our main results. As in Burdett and Vishwanath
(1988), one can relax the condition by introducing a constant cost of search per period,
which further increases a worker’s opportunity cost of rejecting an oﬀer. For simplicity,
however, we have not included such a cost of search.
7T h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei nA s s u m p t i o n2r e ﬂects both workers’ and ﬁrms’ discount rate. For a worker, a
higher discount rate lowers the beneﬁt from experimentation for any given wage. However, when ﬁrms
discount future at a higher rate, the present value of a ﬁlled job falls, and the wage rate in every submarket
must be lower in order to induce ﬁrms to enter, which implies that the loss of the current wage from
experimentation falls. With a common discount rate, the eﬀect through ﬁrms’ discount rate dominates.
9Because employment is permanent, the present value of the job is W(x)/r.I ft h ew o r k e r
does not ﬁnd a job in the current period, he will revise the beliefs to H(x,μ)a n dc o n t i n u e
to search in the next period. In this case, the expected value from the next period onward








Under Assumption 2, the value of search under beliefs μ is given by:
V (μ)=m a x
x∈X
R(x,μ). (2.8)
Denote the set of optimal decisions as G(μ) = argmaxx∈X R(x,μ) and a selection from G(μ)
as g(μ). A worker’s desired wage is w(μ)=W(g(μ)). In contrast, a worker’s reservation
wage can be deﬁned in the conventional way as the lowest permanent income that a worker
will accept to forego search. This is given by rV (μ).
2.4. Free Entry of Firms and the Equilibrium Deﬁnition
T h e r ei sf r e ee n t r yo fﬁrms into the market. After incurring a vacancy cost c ∈ (0,y), a
ﬁrm can post a vacancy for a period in any one of the submarkets. Let J be the net value
of a vacancy. With free entry, J = 0. Recall that the matching probability of a ﬁrm in any
submarket x is x/λ(x) and that employment is permanent. Thus, a ﬁrm’s optimal choice
of the submarket solves the following problem:










As said earlier, the ﬁrm faces no signal extraction problem, because all elements in the
above problem are public information.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the above problem is a diﬀerential equation for the wage
function. Without an initial condition, this equation has a continuum of solutions, which
means that there is a continuum of choices of x that are optimal for the ﬁrm. That is, a ﬁrm
is willing to enter any submarket, provided that the wage in the submarket is consistent
with the free-entry condition, J =0 .





10Recall that x ≤ 1/aH and that λ(x)/x is increasing in x. For future reference, it is useful
to note that, for all x ∈ X, the function W(x) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and
that it has the following properties:
(i)0<W(x) ≤ y;( ii) W
0(x) < 0, (iii)2 W
0(x)+xW
00(x) < 0. (2.11)
Assumption 2 ensures (i), while (2.2) implies (ii) and (iii). Part (ii) says that a higher
employment probability occurs together with a lower wage. This negative relationship is
necessary for providing a meaningful tradeoﬀ between the two variables in directed search.
As such, part (ii) is necessary for inducing ﬁrms to enter the submarket. Part (iii) is
implied by λ00(x) > 0, and it says that the function xW(x) is strictly concave in x.
Focus on stationary symmetric equilibria. An equilibrium consists of workers’ choices
of x, ﬁrms’ choices of x,a n daw a g ef u n c t i o nW(x), that meet the following requirements.
( i )G i v e nt h ew a g ef u n c t i o n ,a l lw o r k e r sw i t ht h es a m eb e l i e fμ at the beginning of a period
use the same search policy x = g(μ). (ii) A ﬁrm’s choice solves the problem in (2.9). (iii)
Conditional on unsuccessful search, a worker’s beliefs are updated according to H(g(μ),μ).
(iv) Consistency: for every submarket x with positive entry, the mass of all ﬁrms who
choose x divided by the eﬃciency units of workers who choose x is equal to λ(x). (v)
Free-entry: for each submarket, the wage function W satisﬁes (2.10).
In the above deﬁnition, we have left out the steady-state conditions on worker ﬂows
a n dt h ew a g ed i s t r i b u t i o n ,w h i c hw i l lb ec h a r a c t e r i z e di nS e c t i o n6 . W ed e l i b e r a t e l yd o
so in order to emphasize the model’s feature that individuals’ decisions and matching
probabilities can be analyzed without any reference to the wage distribution. Instead, all
that is required for such an analysis is the wage function W(.) and the tightness function
λ(.), which are determined by ﬁrms’ free-entry condition and the matching function. This
feature makes the analysis tractable by reducing the dimensionality of the state variables
for individuals’ decision problems signiﬁcantly.8 In contrast, if search were undirected, an
individual’s search decision would depend on the wage distribution which, in turn, would
evolve as individuals learn about his ability.
3. Learning in Competitive Search Equilibrium
Let us analyze a worker’s optimization problem, (2.8). When choosing a submarket x,
the worker faces two considerations. One is the familiar tradeoﬀ between wages and the
matching probability in models of directed search. That is, a submarket with a higher x
8See Shi (2006) for an exploration of this feature in the context of wage-tenure contracts.
11has a lower wage and a higher job-ﬁnding probability. Another consideration is learning
from the search outcome. As discussed earlier, search in a submarket with a high x (i.e.,
a low wage) is more informative than search in a submarket with a low x. To see how the
model captures the value of search, we examine the value function.
It is easy to see that the mapping deﬁned by the right-hand side of (2.8) is a contraction.
Using the features in (2.11), standard arguments show that a unique value function V exists,
which is positive, bounded and continuous on M =[ aL,a H]( s e eT h e o r e m4 . 6i nS t o k e ya n d
Lucas, 1989, p.79). Moreover, the set of maximizers, G, is nonempty, closed, and upper-
hemicontinuous. Existence of the optimal decision, together with the characterization of
the steady-state distribution in section 6, establishes existence of an equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption 2, there exists an equilibrium where all matches are
accepted.
The following lemma describes additional properties of the value function (see Appendix
B for a proof):
Lemma 3.2. V is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and almost everywhere diﬀerentiable.
Monotonicity of the value function determines the behavior of reservation wages, de-
ﬁned as rV (μ). Because V (μ) is strictly increasing, the reservation wage strictly falls
with a worker’s unemployment duration as his beliefs about his own ability deteriorate.
Put diﬀerently, a worker’s permanent income strictly declines over unemployment spells.
Similarly, with strict monotonicity of V , (2.8) implies that a worker’s reservation wage is
always strictly lower than the desired wage, i.e., rV(μ) <W(g(μ)) for all μ>a L.
In contrast to reservation wages, desired wages are much more diﬃcult to analyze since
they depend on optimal learning from search. Search generates information by creating
variations in the worker’s posterior beliefs. As is well known in the learning literature,
such variations are valuable to the individual if the value function is strictly convex in
beliefs. The information content of search depends on both the search choice, x,a n dt h e
prior belief, μ.Ah i g h e rx generates more information in the sense that, for ﬁxed μ,a
higher x causes a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the posterior expectation
E(a|x,k). To see this, note that the search outcome k is a random variable, where k =1
with probability ax and k = 0 with probability (1 − ax). Using (2.5), one can verify that
the expectation of E(a|x,k) with respect to k and a is equal to μ, which is independent of
x.T h ev a r i a n c ei s :











12This variance increases in x,f o ra n yﬁxed μ. However, given x, the above variance is not
monotone in μ. Instead, the variance is maximal at some intermediate value of μ,b e c o m i n g
zero at the boundary points, aL and aH. This feature reﬂects the fact that information
is relatively less useful when prior beliefs are already extreme. Consequently, the value of
information becomes negligible as the prior approaches μ = aL or μ = aH.
Despite such non-monotonicity of the value of information in μ,t h eo p t i m a lc h o i c e ,
g(μ), is monotone in μ, as we will establish in the next section. The reason is that the
opportunity cost of learning from search also depends on the beliefs, μ.T os e et h i s ,n o t e
that a worker with beliefs μ will search in submarket x rather than x0 <xwhenever the
value of information gained by doing so exceeds the opportunity cost of learning. The op-
portunity cost of searching in submarket x as opposed to x0 <xis μ[x0W (x0) − xW (x)]/r.
As beliefs deteriorate with unemployment duration, this opportunity cost decreases, mak-
ing it possible that the optimal choice of x increases with unemployment duration. As it
will become clear in the next section, monotonicity of the optimal search decision relies
crucially on convexity of the value function.
4. Monotonicity of Workers’ Desired Wages
In this section, we establish the central result that a worker’s desired wage, w(μ), increases
with the worker’s beliefs and, hence, decreases with the worker’s unemployment duration.
Because w(μ)=W(g(μ)), where W (.) is decreasing, monotonicity of w(μ)i se q u i v a l e n t
to the feature that the worker’s optimal choice of the submarket, x = g(μ), is decreasing
in μ. Let us deﬁne z = −x and refer to z, rather than x, as the worker’s search decision.
This transformation will be useful for what follows, and it enables us to attach the label
monotone decisions naturally to the feature that z increases in the beliefs. After the
transformation, the objective function in (2.8) becomes R(−z,μ), and the feasible set of
choices is −X 3 z.T h ed o m a i no fμ is M =[ aL,a H].
Before undertaking the task, note that strict convexity of the value function implies that
the objective function R(−z,μ) is not necessarily single-valued or diﬀerentiable. Thus,
the optimal decision is not necessarily unique or interior, and the ﬁrst-order condition
may not be applicable.9 Although these diﬃculties are well known in the literature on
optimal learning (e.g., Easley and Kiefer, 1988), this literature has either ignored them or
focused on corner solutions (e.g., Balvers and Cosimano, 1993). We need to examine all
9In diﬀerent modeling environments, there are techniques to generate smooth optimal choices and
diﬀerentiable value functions, e.g., Santos (1991). However, those techniques require the value function to
be concave, which is violated here.
13solutions in order to characterize how optimal search behavior and desired wages depend
on unemployment duration.
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo ft h ea b o v ed i ﬃculties, a natural way to establish monotonicity of
the workers’ search decision is to use supermodularity in lattice-theoretic techniques (see
Topkis, 1998). In our model, supermodularity of the objective function is equivalent to
the feature of increasing diﬀerences in (z,μ), because these variables lie in closed intervals
of the real line.10 However, the connection between supermodularity and the dynamic
programming problem in (2.8) is far from obvious. In (2.8), the value function is strictly
convex and the current payoﬀ function, −μzW(−z)/r,i sn o ts u p e r m o d u l a ri n( μ,z). The
opposite features are often required in applications of supermodularity to dynamic pro-
gramming, which use concavity of the value function and supermodularity of the current
payoﬀ function, recursively via the Bellman equation, to establish that the objective func-
tion is supermodular.11
However, monotonicity of optimal choice is invariant to transformations of the objec-
tive function that are monotone in the choice variables. Although the objective function
R(−z,μ) is unlikely to be supermodular in (μ,z), it is possible to transform the objective




















Denote Z(μ)=a r gm a x z∈−X ˆ R(z,μ)a n dz(μ) ∈ Z(μ). Clearly, the set of optimal choices
for x is G(μ)=−Z(μ), and a typical selection is g(μ)=−z(μ). Denote the greatest
selection of Z(μ)a s¯ z(μ) and the least selection as z(μ).
The following theorem states the result on monotonicity (see Appendix C for a proof):
Theorem 4.1. Let z ∈− X and μ ∈ M. The function ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly supermodular in
(z,μ). Thus, every selection z(μ) is an increasing function. Similarly, every selection g(μ)
from G(μ) is a decreasing function, and the wage w(μ) is an increasing function.
10Let z ∈ Z and μ ∈ M,w h e r eZ and M are partially ordered sets. A function f(z,μ) has increasing
diﬀerences in (z,μ)i ff(z1,μ 1) − f(z1,μ 2) ≥ f(z2,μ 1) − f(z2,μ 2) for all z1 >z 2 and μ1 >μ 2.I f t h e
inequality is strict, then f has strictly increasing diﬀerences. In our model, Z, M and Z × M (under the
product order) are all lattices. In this case, the feature of increasing diﬀerences implies supermodularity
(see Topkis, 1998, p.45).
11Examples include Amir et al. (1991), Mirman et al. (2007), and Becker and Boyd (1997, pp. 277-284).
14The main task in the proof of this theorem is to establish strict supermodularity of
ˆ R, after which monotonicity of z(μ) follows from Topkis (1998, p.79) and Milgrom and
Shannon (1994). Three aspects of the proof are worth noting. First, every solution for
z is an increasing function of the beliefs. This strong result comes from the feature that
ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly supermodular. Second, strict convexity of the value function plays an
important role for strict supermodularity of ˆ R and, hence, for monotone optimal choices.
Third, strict supermodularity of ˆ R relies only on the properties of the value function, V ,
and the updating function, H, not directly on those of the wage function, W.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
strict supermodularity of ˆ R does not require the current payoﬀ function, −μzW(−z)/r,t o
be supermodular.
Monotonicity of optimal choices is a general result that holds even when optimal choices
are corner solutions and multiple solutions. However, as a general result, the above theorem
allows the possibility that a solution z(μ) is only a weakly increasing function. In the next
section, we address strict monotonicity and other issues.
5. Strict Monotonicity and Uniqueness of the Optimal Path
In this section, we answer two further questions. First, when are desired wages strictly
declining with unemployment duration? I.e., when are optimal choices, z(μ), a strictly
increasing function of beliefs? Second, if optimal choices are not unique, is there any
discipline on the set of paths of optimal choices? To answer these questions, we impose
the following assumption, which ensures that optimal choices are interior solutions:












As shown in Appendix D, this assumption ensures that the objective function, ˆ R(z,aL),
is strictly increasing in z at z = −1/aH, so that even a worker with beliefs μ = aL will ﬁnd
it optimal to choose z>−1/aH.S i n c ez(μ) is increasing, this assumption is suﬃcient for
all workers’ choices to be interior.
It should be noted that Assumptions 2 and 3 can hold simultaneously. For instance, a




















For the above interval of y/c to be non-empty, it is suﬃcient that







15The right-hand side of the above inequality is positive, because λ0 (x) >λ (x)/x for all
x ∈ (0,1/aH] (see (2.2)). With each of the two matching functions in Example 2.1, one can
ﬁnd a non-empty parameter region in which the above condition is satisﬁed. In particular,
when the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, the above condition becomes r + aL/aH >
α/(1 − α), which is satisﬁed when α is small.
In Appendix D, we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Under Assumption 3, an unemployed worker’s optimal choices are interior.
Moreover, the derivative V 0(H(−z(μ),μ)) exists for all z(μ) ∈ Z(μ). Thus, optimal choices













In addition to ensuring interior solutions, this lemma describes a limited sense of dif-
ferentiability of the value function: the value function is diﬀerentiable in future periods at
the posterior beliefs induced by optimal choices, i.e., along the path of optimal choices.
Despite the fact that the value function may still fail to be diﬀerentiable in the ﬁrst period
and at beliefs oﬀ the optimal paths, the limited sense of diﬀerentiability is enough for the
ﬁrst-order condition to be applicable in every period. In turn, the ﬁrst-order condition
enables us to establish strict monotonicity of optimal choices, as stated in the following
theorem (see Appendix E for a proof):
Theorem 5.2. Under Assumption 3, every selection of optimal choices, z(μ), is a strictly
increasing function. Therefore, along every path of optimal choices, desired wages are
strictly declining with unemployment duration.
As it is the case with supermodularity, strict monotonicity of optimal choices relies
on the properties of V (.)a n dH (.), but not those of the wage function W directly. Not
surprisingly, strict convexity of the value function plays a critical role for strict monotonicity
of optimal choices. It is worth noting that Amir (1996) and Edlin and Shannon (1998) also
establish strict monotonicity of optimal choices but, in our model, their methods would
r e q u i r et h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nt ob ec o n t i n u o u s l yd i ﬀerentiable.12 We do not rely on this
requirement because it does not hold in our model.
12In particular, Edlin and Shannon (1998) assume that the objective function, ˆ R(z,μ), has increasing
marginal diﬀerences. To compute marginal diﬀerences, ˆ R(z,μ) must be continuously diﬀerentiable with
respect to z. Because ˆ R depends on z through the future value function, as well as W,i ti sd i ﬀerentiable
with respect to z only if the value function is so.
16Let us now turn to the set of optimal paths. When there are multiple solutions, optimal
c h o i c e sm a ye v o l v eo v e rt i m ei nm a n yw a y s . O n ec a s ei st h a tm u l t i p l ec h o i c e so c c u ri n
every period, in which case the path of optimal choices branches out. Another case is
that multiplicity occurs only in the ﬁrst period. Clearly, the path of optimal choices is
more predictable in the second case than in the ﬁr s tc a s e .T ok n o wm o r ea b o u tt h es e to f
paths of optimal choices, we establish a link between multiplicity of optimal choices and
diﬀerentiability of the value function at all possible beliefs. The following lemma states
t h el i n k( s e eA p p e n d i xFf o rap r o o f ) :
Lemma 5.3. Maintain Assumption 3. For each μa in the interior of (aL,a H),l e tμ+
a
denote the limit to μa from the right (above) and μ−
a the limit from the left (below). Then,
V 0(μ+
a )=R2(−¯ z(μa),μ a) and V 0(μ−
a )=R2(−z(μa),μ a).M o r e o v e r , V 0(μ+
a ) ≥ V 0(μ−
a ),
where the inequality is strict if and only if ¯ z(μa) >z (μa).
This lemma says that, at arbitrary beliefs μ ∈ (aL,a H), the value function is diﬀeren-
tiable if and only if the beliefs induce a unique choice to be optimal. If multiple choices
are optimal at particular beliefs, then the right derivative of the value function is strictly
greater than the left derivative. Denote the set of such beliefs as
N = {μ ∈ (aL,a H):¯ z(μ) >z (μ)}.
Because V is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable, the set N has measure zero in M.
For any μ0 in the interior of M,l e t{μτ}∞
τ=0 be a path of beliefs generated by optimal
choices; i.e., μτ = H(−z(μτ−1),μ τ−1)w i t hz(μτ−1) ∈ Z(μτ−1), for τ =1 ,2,.... For arbitrary
initial beliefs, μ0, the following theorem characterizes the entire set of paths of beliefs and
optimal choices (see Appendix F for a proof):
Theorem 5.4. For any μ0 ∈ (aL,a H),l e tz(μ0) be an arbitrary selection from Z(μ0) and
let μ1 = H(−z(μ0),μ 0) be the posterior beliefs induced by z(μ0).G i v e nμ1, μτ is unique,
Z(μτ) is a singleton, and V 0(μτ) exists for all τ =1 ,2,....I f μ0 / ∈ N,t h e nZ(μ0) is
also a singleton, in which case the entire path {μτ}∞
τ=0 is unique and V 0(μτ) exists for






This theorem states that the paths of optimal choices and induced beliefs are unique
almost everywhere. The only case of non-uniqueness occurs when the worker’s initial prior
belief lies in the set N, which has measure zero. Even in this case, non-uniqueness occurs
17only in the ﬁrst period of search. Given any optimal choice in the ﬁrst period and the
induced posterior, future paths of optimal choices and induced beliefs are unique from
that point onward. Thus, no matter where initial beliefs lie, the worker will choose search
decisions optimally to keep the beliefs out of the set N from the second period onward.
More precisely, whenever the search decision will induce the posterior beliefs to be close
to a particular level in the set N, it is optimal to modify the decision so as to keep the
posterior beliefs above that level. This result is a consequence of the value of learning, as
captured by strict convexity of the value function.
To understand why a worker chooses optimally to avoid the set N in future periods,
s u p p o s ec o u n t e r f a c t u a l l yt h a tt h ew o r k e r ’ sc h o i c ei ns o m ep e r i o dτ induces the posterior
beliefs to lie in N;t h a ti s ,μτ+1 = H(−zτ,μ τ) ∈ N for some τ ≥ 0, where zτ = z(μτ).
In this case, multiple choices will be optimal in period (τ + 1), which induce the left
derivative of V (μτ+1) to be lower than its right derivative. The derivative of the future
value function captures an implicit (opportunity) cost of learning bad news. Thus, the
discrete fall in V 0(μτ+1) from the right side of μτ+1 to the left side implies that learning
slightly more about one’s ability in the current period increases the cost of learning by a
discrete amount. The worker can avoid this discretely larger cost by choosing zτ slightly
above z(μτ), which will keep the posterior slightly above μτ+1. In contrast to this discrete
increase in the beneﬁt, the increase in the cost of zτ is a marginal reduction in the matching
probability. Thus, the net gain from increasing zτ slightly above z(μτ) is positive. This
contradicts the optimality of zτ.
6. Steady State Distributions
We now analyze the aggregate characteristics of the market. One purpose of this analysis
is to clarify that the learning process in previous sections is consistent with aggregation.
The other purpose is to distinguish the duration dependence at an individual’s level from
the aggregate duration dependence.
Let ˆ U, E and L denote the economy-wide unemployment, employment and labor force
at the beginning of period t. The aggregate number of searchers in period t, denoted as U,
includes both ˆ U and the number of newborns, nL.L e tf denote the average job-ﬁnding
rate in the economy. Denoting next period’s variables with a prime, we have:
U = ˆ U + nL, L = ˆ U + E, E
0 = E + fU, ˆ U
0 =( 1− f)U.
Use lowercase letters to denote the ratios of these variables to the labor force, with u =
18U/[(1 + n)L], ˆ u = ˆ U/L,a n de = E/L. Focus on the equilibrium in which these ratios are











Aggregation works out as expected (e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). To be more
speciﬁc, let τ denote a worker’s unemployment duration and μτ denote the worker’s belief
after τ periods of search. Deﬁne Qi(τ) as the probability with which a worker with ability




















Deﬁne LH,t−τ = pLt−τ and LL,t−τ =( 1− p)Lt−τ,w h e r enLt−τ = nLt/(1 + n)
τ is the mass
of new workers who entered the labor market τ periods before t,a n dp is the proportion
of new workers who are endowed with ability aH. At the beginning of period t,t h em a s s
of unemployed workers with ability ai who have already searched for τ periods, denoted as
ˆ Ui,t(τ), is ˆ Ui,t(τ)=nLi,t−τQi(τ), and the mass of all unemployed workers who have already
searched for τ periods, denoted as ˆ Ut(τ), is ˆ Ut(τ)=ˆ UH,t(τ)+ˆ UL,t(τ). Total unemployment


















An implication of our analysis is that learning from search generates unambiguously
negative duration dependence in desired wages: workers lower their desired wages over
their unemployment spell because lower-paid jobs are easier to get. Consequently, positive
duration dependence in job-ﬁnding probabilities, controlling for the worker’s ability, is
the equilibrium counterpart of negative duration dependence in desired wages. However,
without controlling for the worker’s ability, the job-ﬁnding probability may either increase
or decrease with unemployment duration. This ambiguity arises from the fact that the
19ability composition of workers in the market changes endogenously with unemployment
duration. Workers with longer unemployment durations are precisely those who have failed
to ﬁnd a match previously and, at every duration, they are more likely to be workers with
low job-ﬁnding ability. To see this, note that the average job-ﬁnding probability is given by
the ratio of new matches, g(μτ){aH[ˆ Ut(τ)− ˆ UL,t(τ)]+aL ˆ UL,t(τ)},t ot o t a lu n e m p l o y m e n t ,
ˆ Ut(τ). Although g(μτ)i n c r e a s e sw i t hτ, the proportion of low-ability unemployed workers

















ˆ UL,t(τ)/ˆ Ut(τ)i n c r e a s e si nτ, because QH (τ)/QL (τ) decreases in τ, as shown earlier. As a
result, the average eﬃciency of search decreases in τ.
The ambiguous dependence of the average job-ﬁnding probability on unemployment
duration could help explain the lack of evidence of negative duration dependence after
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (Devine and Kiefer, 1991, Machin and Manning,
1999).13 As a related piece of evidence, Shimer (2004) ﬁnds that average search intensity
tends to increase during recessions, when the returns to search are expected to be relatively
low. He points out that this ﬁnding presents a problem to standard search models of the
labor market, which build in a complementarity between search intensity and the returns
to search. Although the context is diﬀerent here, choosing a submarket with a higher x
has the same eﬀect as choosing higher search intensity, since both increase the worker’s
job-ﬁnding probability.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an equilibrium theory of learning from search in the labor
market, which addresses the search behavior of workers, the creation of jobs, and the
wage distribution as functions of unemployment duration. The main assumption is that
unemployed workers have incomplete information about their job-ﬁnding abilities and,
therefore, learn about the abilities from their search outcomes. The theory formalizes a
notion akin to that of discouragement. That is, over the unemployment spell, unemployed
workers update their beliefs about their job-ﬁnding abilities downward and reduce not only
reservation wages, but also desired wages.
13T h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c eo fa ne ﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on the job search behavior. This diﬀerent
mechanism is considered in Burdett (1977) and Mortensen (1977).
20One contribution of the paper has been to integrate learning from search into an equi-
librium framework where search is a directed process. By severing the direct dependence
of search behavior on the wage distribution, the directed search framework has simpliﬁed
the task of addressing jointly the workers’ search behavior, the incentives to create jobs,
a n dt h ew a g ed i s t r i b u t i o ni ne q u i l i b r i u m . A nother contribution has been to explore a
connection between convexity of a worker’s value function in beliefs and the property of
supermodularity. This connection enabled us to employ monotone comparative statics to
establish the properties of desired wages over unemployment despite the potential pres-
ence of non-diﬀerentiable value functions and multiple solutions to a worker’s optimization
problem. This connection is likely to be useful in many other learning problems, because
convexity of the value function in beliefs is a natural consequence of learning.
By providing an equilibrium theory of learning from search and discouragement, our
model has also provided a novel mechanism for generating wage dispersion. The learning
process turns ex ante identical workers into ex post heterogeneous workers who diﬀer in
posterior beliefs about their job-ﬁnding probabilities. This mechanism implies that diﬀer-
ences in unemployment duration among homogeneous workers may be a factor underlying
wage dispersion, particularly among workers who earn relatively low wages. This expla-
nation contrasts with others that also build on search frictions (e.g. Burdett and Judd,
1983, and Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). An empirical investigation of the contribution of
this explanation to the large wage dispersion that is observed among similar workers (e.g.,
Mortensen, 2003) is one avenue for future research.
Other extensions of our model may consider workers’ labor force participation, job
destruction and on-the-job search. These theoretical extensions do not change the nature
of our analysis, but they may provide a useful structural framework for empirical studies
of the wage distribution and the distribution of unemployment durations.
21Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Suppose that the worker chooses to reject a match in submarket x and continue to search
in the next period. Then, his expected payoﬀ of entering a submarket x to search is:
R
e(x,μ) ≡ xμ






Given the analysis leading to Lemma 3.1, it suﬃces to show that Assumption 2 is suﬃcient
for V (μ)=m a x x∈X R(x,μ) ≥ maxx∈X Re(x,μ) for all μ ∈ M,w h e r eM =[ aL,a H]a n d






≥ y/(1 + r). Using the
deﬁnition of W, this condition amounts to Assumption 2. QED
B .P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . 2
Let TV(μ) denote the right-hand side of (2.8). The value function, V ,i saﬁxed point of
the mapping T.L e tC1(M) be the set containing all bounded, continuous and increasing
functions on M.L e t Cs
1(M)b et h es u b s e to fC1(M) that contains all strictly increasing
functions. Similarly, let C2(M) be the subset of C1(M) that contains all convex functions,
and Cs
2(M)b et h es u b s e to fC2(M) that contains all strictly convex functions. We need
to show that V ∈ Cs
1(M) ∩ Cs
2(M).
To show that V ∈ Cs
1(M), it suﬃces to show that T : C1(M) → Cs
1(M), which will
be accomplished by Lemma B.1 below. By the argument of contraction mapping, the
ﬁxed point of T is strictly increasing. Similarly, to prove V ∈ Cs
2(M), it suﬃces to show
that T : C2(M) → Cs
2(M), which will be accomplished by the last two lemmas in this
proof. Because a convex function is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable (see Royden, 1988,
pp.113-114), V is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable.
Let G(μ)=a r gm a x x∈X R(x,μ), where R is deﬁned by (2.7). Let g(μ) ∈ G(μ).
Lemma B.1. T : C1(M) → Cs
1(M).
Proof. Suppose that V ∈ C1(M) in the deﬁnition of R.P i c k a n y μa,μ b ∈ M with
μa >μ b.D e n o t egi = g(μi), where i ∈ {a,b}.W en e e dt os h o wt h a tTV(μa) >TV(μb).
First, note that gb > 0: if gb =0 ,i n s t e a d ,t h e nR(gb,μ b)=V (μb)/(1 + r), and
V (μb)=TV(μb) implies that V (μb) = 0, which contradicts the optimality of gb because
R(x,μb) > 0f o ra n yx ∈ (0,1/aH]a n da n yμb ∈ [aL,a H]. With gb > 0, we have:
R(ga,μ a) − R(gb,μ b) ≥ R(gb,μ a) − R(gb,μ b)








The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that gi ∈ argmaxx R(x,μi) and the second one from
the fact that V (H(gb,μ a)) ≥ V (H(gb,μ b)). The last inequality comes from Assumption
222, the result gb > 0, and the fact that V (H(gb,μ b)) ≤ V (aH) <y / r . Hence, TV(μa) >
TV(μb). QED
Lemma B.2. If V ∈ C2(M),t h e nR(x,μ) deﬁned by (2.7) is convex in μ for any given x.
If V ∈ Cs
2(M),t h e nR(x,μ) is strictly convex in μ.
Proof. We prove the second part of the lemma ﬁrst. Let V be a strictly convex
function. Let μa and μb be two arbitrarily values in M,w i t hμa >μ b.L e tθ ∈ (0,1) be a
number. Denote μθ = θμa +( 1− θ)μb.W es h o wt h a t
R(x,μθ) <θ R (x,μa)+( 1− θ)R(x,μb).
Denote Hi = H(x,μi), where i ∈ {a,b,θ}.S i n c e ∂H/∂μ > 0, then Ha >H θ >H b.
Let σ =( Hθ − Hb)/(Ha − Hb). Note that σ ∈ (0,1) and σHa +( 1− σ)Hb = Hθ.I fV is
strictly convex, then
V (Hθ) <σ V(Ha)+( 1− σ)V (Hb). (B.2)





1+r [σV(Ha)+( 1− σ)V (Hb)]






∆a =( 1− μθx)σ − θ(1 − μax),
∆b =( 1− μθx)(1 − σ) − (1 − θ)(1 − μbx).
For i,j ∈ {a,b,θ}, we use (2.6) to compute:
σ =
(μθ − μb)(1 − μax)





Now it is easy to see that ∆a =0=∆b.T h e r e f o r e ,R is strictly convex.
If V is convex rather than strictly convex, then (B.2) holds as “ ≤ ”i n s t e a do f“< ”.
The rest of the proof can be easily adapted to show that R(x,μ)i sc o n v e xi nμ. QED
Lemma B.3. T : C2(M) → Cs
2(M).
Proof.P i c ka n yV0 ∈ C2(M). Denote V1(μ)=TV0(μ). Let μa and μb be two arbitrary
values in M,w i t hμa >μ b.L e tθ ∈ (0,1) be a number. Denote μθ = θμa +( 1− θ)μb.W e
need to show that
V1(μθ) <θ V 1(μa)+( 1− θ)V1(μb).
We divide the proof in two cases: the case where V0 is strictly convex and the case where
V0 has linear segments.
Case 1: V0 ∈ Cs
2(M). In this case, the previous lemma implies that R(x,μ)i s
strictly convex in μ for any given x. Shorten the notation g(μi)t ogi,w h e r eg(μi) ∈
23argmaxx R(x,μi)a n di ∈ {a,b,θ}. Then, V1(μi)=R(gi,μ i), with V in (2.7) being re-
placed with V0. Strict convexity of V is proven below:
V1(μθ)=R(gθ,μ θ) <θ R (gθ,μ a)+( 1− θ)R(gθ,μ b)
≤ θR(ga,μ a)+( 1− θ)R(gb,μ b)
= θV1(μa)+( 1− θ)V1(μb).
(B.3)
The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that R is strictly convex in μ,a n dt h es e c o n d
inequality from the fact that R(x,μi) ≤ R(gi,μ i)f o ra l lx.
Case 2: V0 is convex and has some linear segments. If any two of the elements,
V0(H(gθ,μ θ)), V0(H(gθ,μ a)) and V0(H(gθ,μ b)), do not lie on the same linear segment of
V0,t h e nt h eﬁrst inequality in (B.3) is still strict and V1 is strictly convex. Suppose that
all three elements lie on the same linear segment of V0. Temporarily denote this linear
segment as V0(H)/(1 + r)=A+BH,w i t hB>0( b e c a u s eV is strictly increasing). Using
(2.6), we can compute:
(1 − μx)V0(H)/(1 + r)=( 1− μx)(A + BaH) − B(1 − aLx)(aH − μ).
This is linear and diﬀerentiable in (μ,x). Restrict μ to be such that V0(H(x,μ)) lies on the
linear segment described above. In this case, R(x,μ) is strictly concave in x iﬀ [xW (x)]
is so. The latter property is implied by (2.11). Thus, the solution g is unique and satisﬁes
the following ﬁrst-order condition:
0=R1(x,μ)=μ[(W + xW
0)/r − A − BaH]+BaL(aH − μ).
Diﬀerentiating this ﬁrst-order condition and using (2.11), we ﬁnd that the solution g(μ)
satisﬁes g0 (μ) < 0. Thus, ga 6= gθ and gb 6= gθ. B e c a u s et h es o l u t i o n sa r eu n i q u ei nt h i s
case, then R(gθ,μ b) <R (gb,μ b)a n dR(gθ,μ a) <R (ga,μ a). The second inequality in (B.3)
is strict, and so V1 is strictly convex. This completes the proofs of the current lemma and
Lemma 3.2. QED
C .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 . 1
Take arbitrary za,zb ∈− X and arbitrary μa,μb ∈ M,w i t hza >z b and μa >μ b. Denote:
D =
h




ˆ R(zb,μ a) − ˆ R(zb,μ b)
i
.
We need to show D>0. Temporarily denote Hij = H(−zi,μ j)a n dVij = V (Hij), where



















+( Vaa − Vab).
There are two cases to consider: μb = aL and μb >a L. First, suppose that μb = aL.
Then Vaa −Vba ≥ 0, with equality if and only if μa = aH; Vab −Vbb =0 ;a n dVaa −Vab > 0.
Hence, D>0 in this case. Next, consider the second case, where μb >a L.H e r e t h e r e
24are also two subcases to consider: μa = aH and μa <a H. We start with the second
subcase. Suppose that μa <a H.B e c a u s e H1(−z,μ) < 0a n dH2(−z,μ) > 0, then

































za−zb +( Haa − Hab).






















































The ﬁrst equality comes from collecting terms according to (aH−μi). Hence, D>0i nt h i s



































Thus, the function ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly supermodular. Because −X is a lattice, the
monotone selection theorem in Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.8.4, p.79) implies that every se-
lection from Z(μ) is increasing. As a result, every selection g(μ)f r o mG(μ) is decreasing,
and w(μ)=W(g(μ)) is increasing. QED
D. Proof of Lemma 5.1
First, we show that optimal choices are interior under Assumption 3. Consider the corner,
z = 0. For any prior beliefs, μ,t h ec h o i c ez = 0 yields zero expected wage in the period
and the posterior beliefs H(0,μ)=μ. The value of this choice is ˆ R(0,μ)=0 ,w h i c hc a n
be increased by any choice z<0. Thus, the choice z = 0 is never optimal.
Now consider the other corner, z = −1/aH.S i n c eo p t i m a lc h o i c e s ,z(μ), are increasing
in μ,as u ﬃcient condition for z>−1/aH is z(aL) > −1/aH. This condition is guaranteed
25if the objective function ˆ R(z,μ)( d e ﬁned in (4.1)) is strictly increasing in z at z = −1/aH.
In turn, a suﬃcient condition for the latter is that ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly increasing in z at
z = −1/aH when H is ﬁxed at H (1/aH,μ), because V (H (−z,μ)) is increasing in z.
Noting that H (1/aH,μ)=aL,w ec a nw r i t et h i ss u ﬃcient condition as
r
1+r













Substituting this inequality for V (aL), (2.10) for W,a n dc o m p u t i n gW0,w ec a nv e r i f y
that Assumption 3 is suﬃcient for (D.1).
Next, we show that V 0(H(−z(μ),μ)) exists. For any real number r,d e ﬁne r− =
limε↓0(r − ε)a n dr+ = limε↓0(r + ε). Fix μ ∈ (aL,a H). Under Assumption 3, the op-
timal choice z(μ) is interior. Optimality requires ˆ R1(z−(μ),μ) ≥ ˆ R1(z+(μ),μ). Note that
a continuous, convex function has left and right derivatives. Because W(−z)i sc o n t i n u o u s ,

























Recall that H1 denotes the derivative of H (−z,μ) with respect to the ﬁrst argument, rather













This implies that optimal choices in every period satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions. QED
E .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . 2
It suﬃces to show that the case z(μa) 6= z(μb)c a n n o to c c u rf o ra n yp a i r( μa,μ b)w i t h
μa >μ b. Suppose to the contrary that z(μa)=z(μb). Denote this common value as z∗.
By Lemma 5.1, z(μa)a n dz(μb) are interior and satisfy ﬁrst-order conditions. That is,
ˆ R1(z
∗,μ a)=0= ˆ R1(z
∗,μ b).
26Shorten the notation H(−z∗,μ i)t oHi,w h e r ei ∈ {a,b}. Substituting ˆ R1(z∗,μ i), we have:
(1 + r)
h
ˆ R1(z∗,μ a) − ˆ R1(z∗,μ b)
i











Because V (H) is continuous and strictly convex, and because V 0(Hb)e x i s t sb yL e m m a5 . 1 ,
we have: V (Ha) − V (Hb) >V0(Hb)(Ha − Hb). Then,
(1 + r)
h
ˆ R1(z∗,μa)− ˆ R1(z∗,μb)
V 0(Hb)
i























The ﬁrst inequality comes from substituting the inequality between the V ’s and the fact
that V 0 > 0; the second (strict) inequality comes from the facts that V is strictly convex,
Ha >H b,a n dH1 < 0. Denote the last expression temporarily as f(μa). Because f is
diﬀerentiable, we can compute:










The second equality comes from property (iv) in Lemma 2.2. Because μa >μ b,t h e n
f(μa) >f (μb)=0 .T h a ti s , ˆ R1(z∗,μ a) > ˆ R1(z∗,μ b). This result contradicts the supposi-
tion that z(μa)=z(μb). QED
F. Proofs of Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.4
First, we prove the following lemma (which does require optimal choices to be interior):
Lemma F.1. ¯ z(μ) is right-continuous and z(μ) is left-continuous at each μ ∈ M.
Proof. Pick an arbitrary μ ∈ M.L e t{μi} be a sequence with μi → μ and μi ≥ μi+1 ≥
μ for all i.B e c a u s e¯ z(μ) is an increasing function, then {¯ z(μi)} is a decreasing sequence
and ¯ z(μi) ≥ ¯ z(μ)f o ra l li.T h u s ,¯ z(μi) ↓ A for some A ≥ ¯ z(μ). On the other hand, the
Theorem of the Maximum (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989) implies that the correspondence
Z(μ) is upper hemicontinuous (uhc). Because μi → μ,a n d¯ z(μi) ∈ Z(μi)f o re a c hi,u h c
of Z implies that there is a subsequence of {¯ z(μi)} that converges to an element in Z(μ).
This element must be A, because all convergent subsequences of a convergent sequence
must have the same limit. Thus, A ∈ Z(μ), and so A ≤ maxZ(μ)=¯ z(μ). Therefore,
¯ z(μi) ↓ A =¯ z(μ), which shows that ¯ z(μ) is right-continuous.
Similarly, by examining the sequence {μi} with μi → μ and μ ≥ μi+1 ≥ μi for all i,w e
can show that z is left-continuous. This completes the proof of Lemma F.1.
27Next, we prove Lemma 5.3. Fix μa ∈ (aL,a H). Because ¯ z(μ)m a x i m i z e sR(−z,μ)f o r
each given μ,t h e n
V (μ)=R(−¯ z(μ),μ) ≥ R(−¯ z(μa),μ)
V (μa)=R(−¯ z(μa),μ a) ≥ R(−¯ z(μ),μ a).
Taking μ>μ a,w h e r eμa <a H, and dividing the above inequalities by (μ−μa), we obtain:
R(−¯ z(μa),μ) − R(−¯ z(μa),μ a)
μ − μa
≤
V (μ) − V (μa)
μ − μa
≤
R(−¯ z(μ),μ) − R(−¯ z(μ),μ a)
μ − μa
.
Take the limit μ ↓ μa. Under Assumption 3, V 0(H(−¯ z(μa),μ a)) exists for each μ (see
Lemma 5.1). Because ¯ z(μ) is right-continuous, then R2(−¯ z(μa),μ a) exists. The limits of
the ﬁrst and last ratios are both R2(−¯ z(μa),μ a). Thus, V 0(μ+
a )=R2(−¯ z(μa),μ a).
Now conduct the above exercise with z replacing ¯ z.F o rμ<μ a and μa >a L,w eh a v e :
R(−z(μa),μ) − R(−z(μa),μ a)
μ − μa
≥
V (μ) − V (μa)
μ − μa
≥
R(−z(μ),μ) − R(−z(μ),μ a)
μ − μa
.
Take the limit μ ↑ μa. Because z(μ) is left-continuous and interior, then V 0(μ−
a )=
R2(−z(μa),μ a).
To establish the inequality between the left- and right-derivatives of V ,u s et h ed e ﬁnition
R(−z,μ)=μ ˆ R(z,μ)t oc o m p u t e :
R2(−z(μ),μ)= ˆ R(z(μ),μ)+μ ˆ R2(z(μ),μ)=V (μ)/μ + μ ˆ R2(z(μ),μ).
Because ˆ R(z,μ) is strictly supermodular, ˆ R2(¯ z(μa),μ a) ≥ ˆ R2(z(μa),μ a), where the inequal-
ity is strict if and only if ¯ z(μa) >z (μa). Therefore, V 0(μ+
a ) ≥ V 0(μ−
a ), where the inequality
is strict if and only if ¯ z(μa) >z (μa). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.3.
Finally, we prove Theorem 5.4. Given any selection z(μ0) ∈ Z(μ0) and the induced
beliefs μ1 = H(−z(μ0),μ 0), Lemma 5.1 implies that V 0(μ1) exists. Then, Lemma 5.3
implies ¯ z(μ1)=z(μ1). That is, Z(μ1)={z(μ1)} is a singleton. So, the posterior belief
induced by Z(μ1) is unique and is given by μ2 = H(−z(μ1),μ 1). Again, Lemma 5.1 implies
that V 0(μ2) exists and Lemma 5.3 implies that ¯ z(μ2)=z(μ2). Repeating this argument
shows that μτ is unique, Z(μτ)i sas i n g l e t o n ,a n dV 0(μτ)e x i s t sf o ra l lτ =1 ,2,....
If μ0 / ∈ N,t h e n¯ z(μ0)=z(μ0) by the deﬁnition of N. In this case, the posterior belief
μ1 = H(z(μ0),μ 0) is unique. Also, Lemma 5.3 implies that V 0(μ0)e x i s t s .I fμ0 ∈ N,a g a i n ,
the results stated in Theorem 5.4 follow from Lemma 5.3. QED
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